

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

1 June 1951

SUBJECT: Staff Planning Project No. 7: STRATEGIC EFFECTS  
OF A SOVIET CONQUEST OF WESTERN EUROPE AND THE  
NEAR EAST\* BEFORE 1953  
(2nd draft for consideration of the Board)

THE PROBLEM

To examine the effect on the East-West power position  
of a Soviet conquest of Western Europe and the Near East  
before 1953.

SCOPE

The study would present a description or summation of  
the potential military and economic accretions to the Soviet  
bloc, first under the hypothetical condition of acquisition

All European continental countries West of the Iron Curtain  
(including Yugoslavia), Greece, Turkey, Iran, the Levant, the  
Arabian peninsula, and Egypt.

DOCUMENT NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. I  
~~DECLASSIFIED~~  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

of the area without US counteraction, resistance and destruction by Western armed forces, etc. The study would then examine certain internal and external factors which might prevent or retard full Soviet realization of the area's war potential. No attempt will be made to reach conclusions regarding a Soviet intent to overrun Western Europe and the Near East, but certain limited conclusions will emerge which would shed light on the relative role of Western Europe and the Near East in the Kremlin's overall strategic planning.

#### QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

I. WHAT MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES COULD THE USSR OBTAIN FROM ACQUISITION OF THE TERRITORY AND TOTAL RESOURCES OF WESTERN EUROPE AND THE NEAR EAST?

(Disregard such factors as US counteraction, destruction by Western forces, and interdiction of the conquered area's normal trade with non-Soviet areas.)

A. Military.

1. Reduction of potential military threat to the USSR? (Denial to the US of manpower, air bases, land approaches to the USSR, etc?)

2. Increased capability for launching attacks against the US, the UK and other non-Soviet countries? (Acquisition of bases, trained manpower, munitions, etc?)

B. Economic and Scientific.

1. What would be the gross Western European and Near Eastern stocks, resources and productive capacity which could contribute to the Soviet potential for war against the US and UK?
2. In what particular lines would the economic and scientific potential of Western Europe and the Near East make the greatest contribution to Soviet strength?

II. TO WHAT EXTENT AND FOR HOW LONG WOULD VARIOUS INTERNAL FACTORS RETARD OR PREVENT FULL SOVIET UTILIZATION OF WESTERN EUROPE AND THE NEAR EAST?

(As in I above, external factors such as US counter-action, etc., would be disregarded.)

A. Military.

1. Overextension of Soviet military forces?
2. Necessity for providing large occupation forces?
3. Difficulties of organizing and controlling non-Soviet armed forces?

**B. Economics.**

1. Problems of integrating the economies of the newly occupied area with that of the present Soviet Orbit. (Conversion and Standardization difficulties, developing profitable trade between them, etc?
2. Soviet technical and managerial limitations?
3. Non-cooperation and obstruction by labor forces?
4. Transportation difficulties?

**III. IN TERMS OF THE NET GAIN TO THE USSR RESULTING FROM A CONQUEST OF WESTERN EUROPE AND THE NEAR EAST, WHAT WOULD BE THE GENERAL EFFECT OF THE FOLLOWING COURSES OF EXTERNAL ACTION?**

(A precise estimate of the damage which could be inflicted by the various courses of action is not expected.)

- A. If the US were able to wage an effective campaign of economic warfare against the Soviet Orbit and the newly conquered areas, to what extent would the estimated reduction in West European and Near Eastern productive facilities reduce the net gain to the USSR of the captured areas?

(Consideration should be given to such factors as: the degree of dependence of West European and Near Eastern industry on imports from non-Soviet areas,

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/05/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200010048-4

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/05/12 : CIA-RDP79R01012A001200010048-4